Lugar: Sala de Reuniones del Departamento de Economía. Edificio Los Madroños, 2ª planta (ECON-2026)

Ponente: David Echeverry (Universidad de Navarra)

Título: Structural Identification of Social Preferences: Heterogeneity Matters for Incentives (trabajo conjunto con María Cristina Figueroa y Sandra Polanía-Reyes)

Abstract:  Using a common pool resource (CPR) game with villagers whose livelihood depends on an actual CPR, we estimate a structural model featuring altruism, reciprocity and inequity aversion. Latent class estimates tied to sociodemographic and attitudinal measures reveal that preferences for equity are widespread. We argue that incentives to reduce individual extraction exert heterogeneous effects across types: a subsidy crowds in inequity aversion and reciprocity, while a fine crowds out the latter but not the former. We illustrate our type classification with data from a gift exchange game built to elicit reciprocity. We confirm the presence of reciprocity, but show that preferences for equity remain important to explain outcomes.